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Swank, et al. Federal/Civil Timely (ext) 
1. Summary. Whether lessees of coal mining lands whose 
leases are subject to termination on short notice without cause 
are entitled to a depletion deduction under Sections 6ll(a) and 
613 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 
2. Facts. The court below considered consolidated suits for 




in each case are identical. During the taxable years in 
question, each taxpayer held one or more leases of coal-bearing 
property and were engaged in the mining of coal therefrom. The 
leases were either of unstated durati nor duration for a term -
of years. Each lease contained a clause permitting either 
,, . 
party, or the lessor alone, to terminate the lease without 
~, 
cause on thirty days' notice. Under the leases, taxpayers were 
granted the right to extract coal from the specified property, 
and to sell it to whomever they wished at whatever price they 
chose. The leases provided for payment of royalties (in one 
case there was a flat annual rent as well) to the lessor based 
on the coal extracted. The extraction and sale of the coal 
represented the sol~ source of revenue from which the taxpayers ----.......... ___________ ---
could recover rents and royalties paid to the lessors. In each 
instance, the taxpayers had mined coal from the leaseholds in 
question for a substantial time before~an~ during the taxable 
years in question. 
For each taxable year in question, the taxpayers claimed 
deductions for depletion of coal reserves on the leasehold 
rr-----------~--------
properties. See I.R.C. § 6Ll, 613 and Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1 
(26 C.F.R.) l [reproduced in an appendix to this memo.]. The IRS 
disallowed the deductions and assessed deficiencies. The 
taxpayers paid the deficiencies and sued for refund in the Ct. 
Cl. 
/ 
3. Decision Below. The Ct. Cl. granted the taxpayers 
relief. It adhered to its earlier decision in Bakertown Coal 
Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d 633 (1973), which had held on 





mining leases did not deprive the lessees of the kind of 
"economic interest" in the minerals in place see Palmer v. 
Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933), that was required for entitlement 
to a depletion deduction. In this case, the court emphasized 
the fact that the taxpayers had mined the respective properties 
for some time~ and it reasoned that the taxpayers "had a very ______, 
good expectation of being able to continue to do so," the 
unexercised termination clauses notwithstanding. The court 
found evidence in the record that despite their legal power to 
terminate, lessors of mining lands rarely do so in practice. 
For the same reason, the court also rejected the 
government's contention that the taxpayers did not qualify for 
'-=, 
depletion deductions because they would be unable to calculate ..___ 
either their interest in the coal or the portion of that -··--------· --------- -"'"".. interest that would be depleted during the taxable year. The ------------court ruled that the strength of the taxpayers' expectations 
that their leases would continue made it possible for them to 
make these calculations. 
J ~ 
Finally, the court stressed, as it had in Baker, that the ~ 
''If~~ 
 
lessors would not be entitled to the depletion deduction. 
[taxpayers] are not entitled, there will be no depletion on the~ 
coal mined under the leases ...• Where ~ e can be no other ~ 
~~ 
claimant, we believe that neither the Internal Revenue Service -t-c__ 
I 
nor the courts should be too technical or too harsh in finding ~ 
the only possible applicant to be ineligible."  
~-t 
4. Contentions. ·rhe SG argues that the Court should grant  
cert. because the decision below is in conflict with decisions 
I 
- 4 -
on the same issue by other courts. The leading case for a 
contrary view is Whitmer v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 170 ~ ~ 
1971}, with which the Baker case expressly disagreed.!/ ~ 
Other cases following the CA 3's rationale include Costantin~ 
u. ~ 
v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405, 409 1971}; Mullins v. 
Commi'ssioner, (1967); Winters Coal Co. v. 
F.2d 995 
(1971), rev'd on other grounds, 496 
Holbrook v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 415 
v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594, 606-609 (1979). 
' In addition, the SG states that several courts have indicated 
that a lessor's right to terminate a lease is a significant 
factor in determ-ining the lessee's entitlement· to a depletion 
deduction. United States v. Stallard, 273 F.2d 847 (CA 4 
1959}; McCall v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699 (CA 4 1963); United 
States v. Wade, 381 F.2d 345 (CA 5 1967). See also Ramey v. 
Commissioner, 47 T.C. 363, 375 (1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 478 (CA 
6 1968); Usibelli v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 539 (CA 9 1955); 
Rissler & McMurry Co. v. United States, 480 F.2d 684 (CA 10 
1973). Unless the Court grants cert. to resolve this 
controversy, tax laws applicable to mining of mineral resources 
will not be uniformly applied. 
In the SG's view, the decision below is incorrect. This 
Court often has recognized that the purpose of the depletion 
deduction is "to permit the owner of a capital interest in 
1/ The SG says that the United States did not petition 
for cert. in Baker because it was not then aware that the issue 
would have recurring consequences of some financial magnitude. 
In a supplemental memorandum, the SG states that there are 
currently 12 cases a, . h. 




mineral in place to make a tax-free recovery of that depleting 
capital asset." Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215, 220 (1959). 
The "economic interest" test was developed to determine whether 
a taxpayer has the kind of capital investment in the mineral 
resource that justifies allowing such a recovery. As this 
Court recognized in Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 
362, 367 (1938), "the phrase 'economic interest' is not to be 
taken as embracing a mere economic advantage derived from 
production, through a contractual relation to the owner, by one 
who has no capital investment in the mineral deposit." 
The decision below misapplies the "economic interest" test 
to taxpayers who derive only a "mere economic advantage" from 
extraction of the mineral deposit. Because of their right of 
termination of the leases, it is the lessors, not the 
taxpayers, who possess an economic interest in the coal in 
place. The importance of such a right of termination was 
explicitly recognized by this Court's decision in Parsons v. 
Smith, 359 U.S., at 595. Other factors were also at play in 
that case, but the Ct. Cl.'s attempt in Baker to distinguish 
Parsons neglects the "economic reality" that the right of 
termination has a profound effect on the continuity of the 
taxpayer's interest in the mineral-bearing property. 
Finally, the SG asserts that the Ct. Cl. placed too much 
emphasis on the presumed inability of the lessors to claim the 
depletion deduction. Instead, the lessors receive capital 
gains treatment of the revenues under Section 631(c) of the 
I.R.C. That treatment, like the depletion deduction, is 
designed to permit recoupment of capital investment in the 
- 6 -
minerals, and it too applies only where the "owner retains an 
economic interest in such coal." Commissioner v. Southwest 
Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1956). Accordingly, the 
lessor is insured of making a tax-free recovery of the 
depleting capital asset, and the purpose for which the 
depletion deduction was created is served. 
Resps argue that the SG overstates the asserted conflict. 
The CA 3's position is directly contrary, but for 9 years no 
other CA has followed it. For a time the Tax Court agreed with 
the CA 3; but recently it has been critical of the CA 3's view, 
and in Weaver v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 594 (1979), it allowed a 
lessee to take a depletion deduction despite ah unexercised 
termination clause with a 120-day notice period. In addition, 
the SG overdraws the financial significance of the issue; since 
the Bakertown decision, most coal operators have been able to 
renegotiate termination clauses of their leases to avoid the 
problem, and in any event under the SG's theory the lessor 
would be able to take the deduction if the lessee could not. 
Resps further argue that the decision below is in harmony 
with decisions of this Court. The Court's definitive word on 
the economic interest test came in Paragon Jewel Company, Inc. 
v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624 (1965), which held that a lessee, 
rather than the lessee's contractors, was entitled to a 
depletion deduction for coal. The Court reached this decision 
despite the fact that the lease was "silent regarding 
termination " Id., at 630. Apparently, the Court did not 
regard the presence or absence of terminability as a 
controlling factor. Resps note that Treasury regulations on 
- 7 -
the availability of the depletion deduction have remained 
virtually unchanged since they were issued after the Bankline 
case, and they have never contained even a suggestion that 
non-terminability of leases is a requirement for entitlement to 
a depletion deduction. 
Finally, resps argue that under the circumstances of these 
cases no other taxpayer may claim the depletion deductions, 
although in the Bull Run case the lessor did take capital gains 
on its royalties. 
5. Discussion. This case presents a clear-cut conflict on a 
matter that is of at least some importance in the 
administration of the tax laws. Relative to this Court's prior 
cases defining the scope of entitlement to the depletion 
deduction, the issue framed by this case is of a rather 
technical nature. The parties seem to agree that terminability 
of leases is a factor in determining whether a lessee has an 
"economic interest" in the mineral in place; their disagreement 
is over the factor's importance. Moreover, the conflict has 
been in existence for several years without producing any 
untoward consequences. This may be due, as resps suggest, to 
the ability of mining lessees to modify the termination clauses 
of their leases; or it may be due to careful forum shopping by 
tax counsel. Nevertheless, well reasoned opinions have been 
written on both sides of the issue, and it is doubtful that the 
matter will be fully resolved unless this Court decides it. 
Accordingly, I recommend that cert. be granted. 
There is a response. 










Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.): 
SEC. 611. ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION 
FOR DEPLETION. 
(a) General Rule.-In the case of mines, bil 
and gas wells, other natural deposits, and timber, 
there shall be allowed as a deduction in computing 
taxable income a reasonable allowance for de-
pletion and for depreciation of improvements, ac-
cording to the peculiar conditions in each case; 
such reasonable allowance in all cases to be made 
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. 
• • * 
• • • • • 
SEC. 613. PERCENTAGE DEPLETION. 
(a) General Rule.-In the case of the mines, 
wells, and other natural deposits listed in subsec-
tion (b), the allowance for depletion under sec-
tion 611 shall be the percentage, specified in sub-
section (b) , of the gross income f ram the prop-
erty excluding from such gross income an amount 
equal to any rents or royalties paid or incurred 
by the taxpayer in respect of the property. Such 
allowance shall not exceed 50 percent of the tax-
payers' taxable income from the property ( com-
puted without allowance for depletion). * * * In 
no case shall the allowance for depletion under 
section 611 be less than it would be if computed 
without reference to this section. · 
• • • • • 
,, 









Treasury Regulations on Income Tax (1954 Code) 
(26 C.F.R.): 
§ 1.611-1. Allowance of deduction for de-pletion. 
(a) Depletion of mines, oil and gas wells, 
other natural deposits, and ti_Jy~ber-(1) In gen-
eral. Section 611 provides that there shall be 
allowed as a deduction in computing taxable in-
come in the case of mines, oil and gas wells, 
other . natural deposits, and timber, a reasonable 
allowance for depletion. * * * In the case of other 
exhaustible natural resources the allowance for 
depletion shall be computed upon either the ad-
justed depletion basis of the property ( see sec-
tion 612, relating to cost depletion) or upon a 
percentage of gross income from the property 
(see section 613, relating to percentage deple-
tion), whichever results in the greater allowance 
for depletion for any taxable year. In no case 
will depletion based upon discovery value be 
allowed. 
* "' "' "' "' 
(b) Economic interest. (1) Annual depletion 
deductions are allowed only to the owner of an 
economic interest in mineral deposits or stand-
ing timber. An economic interest is possessed in 
every case in which the taxpayer has acquired by 
investment any interest in mineral in place or 
standing timber and secures, by any form of 
legal relationship, income derived from the ex- ,. 
traction of the mineral or severance of the 
timber, to which he must look for a return of his 
capital. For an exception in the case of certain 
mineral production payments, see section 636 and 
the regulations thereunder. A person who has 
---......-----------·~-
( 
no capital investment in the mineral deposit or 
standing timber does not possess an economic 
interest merely because through a contractual 
relation he possesses a mere economic or pecuni-
ary advantage derived from production. For ex-
ample, an agreemci1t between the owner of an 
economic interest and another entitling the latter 
to purchase or process the product upon produc-
tion or entitling the latter to compensation for 
extraction or cutting does not convey a depletable 
economic interest. Further, depletion deductions 
with respect to an economic interest of a corpora-
tion are allowed to the corporation and not to its 
shareholders. · 
"tr •• ,. tOYI.INIUNT PIINTINt o,r1c1: ,~oo 31S022 :UIS 
May 8, 1980 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ..... . ... . ...... . .. , 19 .. . Assigned . . ................ , 19... No. 79-1515 





G I/ D 
Burger, Ch. J ... . .. ... ........ ~tr ••• 
Brennan, J ..................... V. 1 • •• 
. t/ 
Stewart, J ........................... . 
White, J . . ........ . .. . ....... . V. .. . 
Marshall, J ......... . . . ........ ~ ... . 
Blackmun, J ................... \(.' .... . 
v' Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... / .... 





N POST DIS AFF 
MERITS MOTION 
ABSENT N OT VOTI NG 
REV AFJi G D 











J ~ ~ ct...~""' •ae el,e•C:...~ 
/\ 
~~ . i ' 
lZu,_cf P'Jri 4~4.-~ ~ 





; ,. . 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg Morgan 
December 8, 1980 
No. 79-1515: United States v. Swank, et al. 
Question Presented 
The question in this case is whether the lessee of a 
mineral lease is entitled to a depletion deduction under§§ 611 
d(a) and 613 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 • 
•• -.-t .... 
2. 
Background 
These three cases were consolidated in the Court of 
Claims. In each case, the lessee of a mineral lease claimed on 
its tax returns a depletion deduction for coal mined from the 
land covered by the lease, and in each the lessee brought a 
refund action after the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) disallowed the deduction. 
Elwood Swank striped-mined coal from land that he 
leased from Northumberland County, Pennsylvania. According to 
the lease, Swank paid to the county a royalty of 35 cents per 
ton of mined coal. Swank was free to sell the coal to whomever 
he pleased and at whatever pr ice he could obtain. The lease 
was terminable upon notice by the county, without cause. 
Black Hawk Coal Corporation, Inc. mined coal from 
land that it leased from a private owner. Black Hawk paid 
either a monthly rent or a royalty of 25 cents per ton, 
whichever was greater. Black Hawk could sell the coal to :~ 
whomever it pleased and at any price it could obtain. Either 
party to the lease could terminate it on 30 days' notice, 
without cause. 
Bull Run Mining Co, Inc. also mined coal from land 
that it leased from a private owner. Bull Run paid a 25 cents 
royalty per ton, and had to offer its coal to the leasor before 
selling it on the open market. This lease too was terminable 
upon 30 days' notice, without cause. 





Claims held that the lessees were 
entitled to the refund they sought. The court agreed with the 
l ( \. \ 
IRS that an economic interest in the minerals in place is a -prerequisite to an entitlement to the depletion deduction, but 
the court rejected the IRS' s argument that the termination 
clause in each lease deprived the lessees of such an economic 
interest. 
Because the Court of Claims' decision conflicted with 
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
Whitmer v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971), the 
granted the Solicitor General's petition for certiorari. 
Contentions 
A. Petitioner. 
Petitioner contends that the lessees (hereinafter 
respondents) cannot claim a depletion deduction because they do 
not have the requisite "economic interest" in the minerals in : ~ 
place. Petitioner relies on Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 
(1933), and Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938), 
for the proposition that such an economic interest requires 
more than the receipt of income derived from the extraction or 
sale of minerals. Petitioner contends that this is so because 
the deduction is meant to provide a tax-free recovery of the 
impairment of capital resulting from the exhaustion of the 
mineral deposit. Thus, petitioner contends, the claimant to 
the deduction must have a capital investment in the minerals in 
4. 
place which diminishes in value as a consequence of the 
extraction. In petitioner's view, respondents do not have such 
a capital investment because their rights to extract the 
minerals are subject to termination upon notice, without cause. 
Petitioner therefore contends that these cases are controlled 
by Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959), and Paragon Jewel 
Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624 (1965). 
B. Respondents. 
Respondents each claim that they have the requisite 
economic interest in the minerals in place, and they each 
distinguish Parsons and Paragon Jewel on their facts. 
(1) Swank contends that he has an economic interest 
in the minerals in place by virtue of owning an interest in the 
minerals in place, by investment, and by securing income from 
the extraction of the minerals. Swank's income from the 
extraction is undisputed. His investment is in the equipment 
and improvements necessary to effect the extraction. His claim:~ 
of ownership relies upon the contention that his "lease" from 
the county, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, constitutes "a 
grant of an interest in the land itself." Shenandoah Borough 
v. Philadelphia, 367 Pa. 180 (1951). Furthermore, Swank offers 
two reasons why the termination clause in his lease does not 
negate his economic interest in the minerals in place. First, 
Swank contends that the termination clause is immaterial 
because his lease was never terminated. Second, Swank contends 
that the termination clause is immaterial because Parsons and 
5. 
Paragon Jewel, which place some weight upon terminability, 
apply only to cases involving mining contractors and not to 
cases involving lessees. 
(2) Black Hawk and Bull Run reiterate Swank's 
arguments, and they further contend that the "controlling fact" 
in their cases is that the termination clauses in the leases 
were never invoked. Accordingly, they contend that there is 
nothing to negate the economic interest which they acquired in 
the minerals in place by investing in the equipment and 
improvements necessary to mine the coal and then by mining the 
coal to exhaustion. Black Hawk and Bull Run also distinguish 
Parsons and Paragon Jewel on the ground that those cases are 
limited to mining contractors. 
Discussion 
I am inclined to conclude that the Court of Claims 
erred in finding that respondents are entitled to the depletion :~ 
deduction. 
First, respondents are wrong to the extent that they 
argue that Parsons and Paragon Jewel do not supply the legal 
principle to be applied in this case. Respondents are correct 
that the claimants in those cases were contracting miners, not 
lessees. But the import of those cases is that entitlement to 
the deduction turns upon the particular facts of the 
contractual arrangement between the land owner and the claimant 
6 • 
of the deduction, whether the claimant is a lessee or a 
contracting miner. 
Second, respondents appear to give undue weight to 
the fact that the term i nation clauses were never executed. The 
fact remains that respondents' ability to extract and profit by 
the coal was terminable at the will of the lessors. Given that 
] 
fact, I find it difficult to perceive that respondents had an 
interest in the coal "in place." In contrast, I can understand 
~ that they had an economic interest in the extraction and in the 
sale of the coal. 
For these two reasons, I am inclined to recommend 
accepting the Solicitor General's argument that respondents are 
not entitled to the depletiondeduction because they lack the 
requisite economic interest. I therefore recommend reversing 
the judgment of the Court of Claims. 
: 
,. 
79-1515 U. S. V. SWANK Argued 12/9/80 
~~~~ 
~t-~Hu,::t~~~~~ 
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UNITED ST A TES, PETITIONER, v. EL WOOD SWANK 
.ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF CLAIMS 
[March--, 1981] 
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The owner of an economic interest in a mineral deposit is 
allowed a special deduction from taxable income measured 
by a percentage of his gross income derived from exhaustion 
of the mineral. This deduction, codified in §§ 611 and 613 
of the Internal Revenue Code, is designed to compensate 
such owners for the exhaustion of their interest in a wasting 
asset, the mineral in place.' This case presents the question 
'"SEC. 61 l. Allowance of deduction for depletion: 
"(a) General Rule-In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other natural 




taxable income a reasonable allowance for depletion and for depreciation -;7 
of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each case; such / ~ "'1-J 
reasonable allowa.· nee in all cases to be made under regulations prescribed . ~~ 
by the Secretary. . t!f/t.-  _.. • 
"SEC. ~13. Percentag~ depletion: . . . . .~ 
"(a) Gmeral Rule-In the case of the mines, wells, and other natural de- · 1 ~ --,-
· posits listed in subsection (b), the allowance for depletion under§ 611 shall  
be the percentage, specified in subsection (b), of the gross income from  
the property excluding from such gross income an amount equal to any 
rents or royalties paid or incurred by the taxpayer in respect of the prop- A.- A J _ 
erty. Such allowance shall not exceed 50% of the taxpayer's taxable in- ~ ~~
come from the property (computed without allowance for depletion). 
* * * In no case shall the allowance for depletion under § 6 ll be less 
than it would be if computed without reference to this section." 
"(h) I'ercl'ntage depletion rates-The mines, wells, and other natural de-
I' 
1- --.--
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whether that "percentage depletion" allowance must be de-
nied to otherwise eligible lessees of underground coal be-
cause their leases were subject to termination by the lessor 
on 30-days notice. 
This question arises out of three different tax refund suits 
that were decided by the Court of Claims in a single opinion. 
602 F. 2d 348. The controlling facts are essentially the 
same in all three cases. Each taxpayer operated a coal mine 
pursuant to a lease that provided for a fixed royalty per ton 
to be paid to the lessor and which gave the lessee the right to 
extract coal and to sell it at prices determined by the lessee. 
Each lease contained a clause permitting the lessor to termi-
nate the lease on 30-days notice. In fact, however, none of 
the lessors exercised that right; each lessee mined a substan-
tial tonnage of coal during an uninterrupted operation that 
continued for several years. The proceeds from the sale of 
the coal represented the only revenue from which the lessees 
recovered the royalties paid to the lessors. 
In each of the cases, certain additional facts help to illumi-
nate the issue. In the Black Hawk' case the lease was to con-
tinue "during the term commencing on the first day of 
March 1964, and terminating when lessee shall have ex-
hausted all of The Feds Creek (or Clintwood) Seam of coal, 
... or until said tenancy shall be earlier terminated .... " 
App. 77a. The lease required Black Hawk to pay a royalty 
of 25¢ per ton of coal or $5,000 per year, whichever was 
larger. App. 77a-78a. In addition, the lease required 
Black Hawk to pay all taxes on the underground coal, as well 
as the taxes on its plant and equipment and on mined coal. 
App. 79a. Black Hawk paid independent contractors a 
posits, and the percentages, referred to in subsection (a) are as follows : 
(4) 10%-Asbestos,. .. brucite, coal, lignite, perlite , sodium chloride, 
and wollastonite . 
' Black Hawk Coal Co., Inc. operated drift mines in Hike County, Ken-
tucky. Its refund suit covered the tax years 1970-1972. 
t 
9$15151, 25-MAR-81 DRB, 3/25 revise wmk 
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. fixed price per ton to remove the coal, and Black Hawk was 
free to sell the coal to any party at whatever price it could 
obtain. Black Hawk mined the seam to exhaustion, operat-
ing continuously under the lease for 13 years. App. 
70a-7la. The Government stipulated that Black Hawk was 
the sole claimant to the percentage depletion deduction; no 
claim had been made by the lessor or by any independent 
mining contractor employed by Black Hawk. App. 7 la. 
The Swank case involves two separate leases executed by 
Swank and Northumberland County, Pennsylvania, pursu-
ant to which Swank operated mines on land owned by the 
County. The first lease, a deep mining lease executed in 
1964, was terminated in 1968 after a mountain slide forced 
Swank to close the mine. App. 52a. The second, a strip 
mining lease executed in 1966, was still being operated by · 
Swank's successor in interest in 1977 when the case was 
· tried. During the tax years in dispute, Swank's royalty pay-
ments to the County at the rate of $.35 a ton amounted to 
$7,545.10 in 1966 and $6,854.05 in 1967. App. 53a. The 
deduction for depletion, which was based on the gross in-
come received from the sale of the coal, was significantly 
larger." The record also indicates that Swank invested sig-
nificant sums in the construction of access roads, the acquisi-
tion of equipment, and the purchase and improvement of a 
"tipple"-the surface structure that is used to remove slate 
and rock from the mined product and to sort the coal into 
specific sizes for marketing. App. 55a- 56a. 
The Bull Run' case involves a five-year lease executed in 
1967 and renewed in 1972. App. 90a- 9la. Unlike the 
"The Govermenl states that the depletion deductions claimed by 
Swank in 1966 and 1967 amounted to $41,371.24 and $15,204.32. App. 
53a. No other party claimed Lhe depletion deduction · on coal mined by 
Swank. 
'Bull Run Mining Co. operaled in West Virginia. In ils bt ief, Bull 
Run states that the leased coal was mined to exhaustion in September 
1978. Brief for Respondent Bull Run Mining Co. 2. 
; ,. . 
9$15151, 25-MAR-81 DRB, 3/25 revise wmk 
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leases in the other cases, it gave the lessor a right of first pur-
chase if it was willing to meet the lessee's price, and in the tax 
year in dispute the lessor did purchase all of the coal mined 
by Bull Run. 602 F. 2d, at 350, n. 4. The lease did not, 
however, limit the lessee's right to set selling prices or to sell 
to others who were willing to pay more than the lessor. Ibid. 
Like the lease in Black Hawk, the lease provided for a roy-
alty of25¢ per ton. App. 9 la. As is also true in both Black 
Hawk and Swank, there is no suggestion that any other party 
has made any claim to any part of the percentage depletion 
allowance at issue in this case." See app. 92a. The Bull 
Run lease, like the others, contained a provision giving the 
lessor the right to cancel on 30-days written notice." 
I 
Since 1913 the Internal Revenue Code has provided spe-
cial deductions for depletion of wasting assets. We have ex-
plained these deductions as resting "on the theory that the 
extraction of minerals gradually exhausts the capital invest-
ment in the mineral deposit," and therefore the depletion 
allowance permits "a recoupment of the owner's capital in-
vestment in the minerals so that when · the minerals are ex-
·, Bull Run claimed a depletion deduction of $39,981.41 for 1974, the 
lax year in question. App. 92a. 
"The relevant section of the lease provides: 
"CANCELLATION. It is agreed between the parties that either party to 
this agreement may cancel this lease upon giving to the other party a writ-
ten notice at least thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of said cancel-
lation. If any coal is mined during said thirty (30) clay period, the same 
shall be paid for the same as if said notice were not given, and upon the 
expiration of said thirty (30) days, Lessee agrees to deliver the possession 
of said premises to the Lessor. Upon such cancellation becoming effec-
tive, Lessor shall reasonably compensate Lessee for the then fair market 
value of track, conveyors, dumps, bins, motors and other equipment 
which Lessee shall have allixed to the premises, and if the parties cannot 
agree upon such compensation, Lessee shall have a period of four (4) 
months within which to remove his equipment, from the effective date of 
cancellation." Aµp. 96a. 
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hausted, the owner's capital is unimpaired." Commissioner v. 
Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312. 7 The percent-
age depletion allowance, however, is clearly more than a 
method of enabling the operator of a coal mine to recover 
the amount he has paid for the unmined coal. Because the 
deduction is computed as a percentage of his gross income 
from the mining operation and is not computed with refer-
ence to the operator's investment, it provides a special incen-
tive for engaging in this line of business that goes well be-
yond a purpose of merely allowing the owner of a wasting 
asset to recoup the capital invested in that asset: As the 
Court said in Southwest Exploration Co., supra: 
"The present allowance, however, bears little relation-
ship to the capital investment, and the taxpayer is not 
limited to a recoupment on his original investment. 
The allowance continues so long as minerals are ex-
tracted, and even though no money was actually in-
vested in the deposit. The depletion allowance in the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 [the forerunner of the 
present statute] is solely a matter of Congressional 
grace; .... " 350 U.S., at 312." 
'In Helvrring v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362,366, the Court ex-
plained that the deduction "is permitted in recognition of the fact that the 
mineral deposits are wasting assets and is intended as compensation to the 
owner for the part used up in production." 
"The Swank case is illustrative of the nature of the depletion deduction. 
We can determine from the fact that. Swank paid royalties of $7,545.10 in 
1966 and $6,854.05 in 1967 that Swank mined roughly the same amount 
of coal in both years, 21,557 tons in 1966 and 19,585 tons in 1967. Thus 
Swank could apparently claim a depletion allowance of about $1.92 per 
ton in 1966 and about $. 78 per ton in 1967. Inasmuch as the depletion 
allowance is a percentage of gross income, these figures-which suggest 
that the selling price of the coal may have been almost as high as $20.00 a 
ton-indicate the lack of any specific relationship between the lessee's cost 
of the raw coal and the value of the depletion allowance. 
"In the Revenue Act of 19 J 8, the capital to be recovered through the 
depletion allowance was not determined by the owner's investment in the 
minerals but rather was measured by the fair market value of the property 
; ,. . 
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Hence eligibility for the deduction is determined not by the 
amount of the capital investment but by the mine operator's 
"economic interest" in the coal.'" 
A recognition that the percentage depletion allowance is 
more than merely a recovery of the cost of the unmined coal 
is especially significant in this case. The question here is 
whether a deduction for the asset depleted by respondents 
will be received by anyone." The tax consequences of the 
at the date the tnineral deposits were "discovered." See Revenue Act of 
1918, ch. 18, §§214 (a) (10), 234 (a) (9), 40 Stat. 1068, 1078. Although 
this method of determining the depletion allowance was changed in l 92~ LP 
to the percentage depletion method, this Court, in Helvering v. Bankline Oil 
Co., 303 U.S. 362, 366-367, recognized that "[t]he granting of an arbi-
trary deduction, .... of a percentage of gross income was in the interest of 
convenience and in no way altered the fundamental theory of the 
allowance." Thus the depletion deduction has never been strictly limited 
to a recoupment of the operator's investment. 
'" The Court developed the "economic interest" test in Palmer v. Bender, 
287 U.S. 551,557. In Palmer, the Court stated: 
"The language of the statute is broad enough to provide, at least, for 
every case in which the taxpayer has acquired, by investment, any interest 
in the oil in place, and secures, by any form of legal relationship, income 
derived from the extraction of the oil, to which he must look for a return 
of his capital." 
11 The Government argues that the Court of Claims erred in concluding 
that a consequence of the Government's position is that no one will receive 
the percentage depletion deduction. See 602 F. 2d, at 35 l; Brief for Peti-
tioner 22-23. This argument is not persuasive. 
Under§ 631 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code, the lessor is required to 
treat his royalty income as a capital gain and is not entitled to claim a per-
centage depletion deduction. Section 631 (c) provides in pertinent part: 
"In the case of the disposal of coal (including lignite), or iron ore mined 
in the United States, held for more than 9 months before such disposal, by 
the owner thereof under any form of contract by virtue of which such 
owner retains an economic interest in such coal or iron ore, the difference 
between the amount realized from the disposal of such coal or iron ore 
and the adjusted depletion basis therof plus the deductions disallowed 
from the the taxable year under § 272 shall be considered as though it 
were a gain or loss, as the case may be, on the sale of such coal or iron ore. 
S 11ch. oww'r shall not b1' entit/Nl to the allowance for fJercentage depletion providl'd 
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lessors' receipt of royalties will not be affected, either favor-
ably or unfavorably, by our decision in this case.'" The Gov-
ernment therefore is not contending that the wrong party is 
claiming the percentage depletion allowance. Rather, the 
Government takes the position that no such deduction shall 
be allowed to any party if the legal interest of the lessee-
operator is subject to cancellation on short notice.'' 
in § 613 with respect to such coal or iron ore. This subsection shall not apply 
to .income realized by any owner as a co-adventurer, partner, or principal 
in the mining of such coal or iron ore, and the word "owner" means any 
person who owns an economic interest in coal or iron ore in place, includ-
ing a sublessor." 26 U. S. C. § 631 (c) (Emphasis added). 
Unlike the percentage depletion deduction, the capital gains treatment 
required by § 631 (c) is directly related to the lessor's capital investment in 
the mine. BecatJse the lessor's gain is measured by the difference be-
tween his cost, computed on a per ton basis, and his royalty, he of course 
recoups his capital investment as the coal is mined. · In this sense, he re-
ceives "cost depletion." The difference between the lessor's "cost deple-
tion" and the lessee's "percentage depletion" is indicated by the record in 
the Swank case. In 1966 the royalty payments amounted to $7,545. l O; a 
part of that amount was the lessor's capital gain and the remainder was his 
"cost depletion." In contrast, the "percentage depletion" claimed by the 
lessee amounted to $41,371.24. The amounts are not in dispute. Thus, 
contrary to the Government's argument, the provision of capital gains 
treatment to the lessor does not indicate that the percentage depletion de-
duction, which we have characterized as a form of "Congressional grace," 
will be available to some other party if it cannot be claimed by the lessee. 
Seen. 12, infra. 
" The Government conceded at oral argument that the lessor's entitle-
ment to the capital gain treatment of the royalty proceeds would be the 
same regardless of whether the lessee is entitled to percentage depletion. 
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16. Moreover, the Government also conceded that 
even if the the lessees had a long term lease and were clearly entitled lo 
the depletion allowance, the lessors would nevertheless have a retained 
economic interest in the coal. Id. at 16-18. Therefore, the lessors would 
be required by § 631 (c) to take capital gains rather than a depletion de-
duction regardle.ss of whether we hold that the lessee is entitled to the per-
centage depletion deduction. 
r, Although these cases involve provisions for cancellation on 30-day no- · 
tice. the Government advises us that it takes the same position with respect 
to any lease cancellable on less than one year's notice. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 
; ,. . 
I 
I 
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II 
The language of the controlling statute makes no refer-
ence to the minimum duration of the interest in mineral de-
posits on which a taxpayer may base his claim to percentage 
depletion. 11 The relevant Treasury regulation merely re-
quires the taxpayer to have an "economic interest" in the 
unmined coal.'" That term is broadly defined by regulation 
as follows: 
"(b) Economic interest. (I) Annual depletion deductions 
are allowed only to the owner of an economic interest in 
mineral deposits or standing timber. An economic in-
terest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer 
has acquired by investment any interest in mineral in 
place or standing timber and secures, by any form of 
legal relationship, income derived from the extraction 
of the mineral or severance of the timber, to which he 
must look for a return of his capital.""; 
The Government's argument that the termination clause de-
prived the lessees of an economic interest is advanced in two 
forms. First, the Government notes that the regulation dis-
8. This posiLion has its genesis in G. C. M. 26290, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 42, 
declared obsolete, Rev . Rul. 70-507, 1974 Cum. Bull. 280. See also Rev. 
Rul. 74-507, 1974-2 Cum. Bull. 179. 
'' See n. l, supra. 
r:, The Court early recognized that lessees had an economic interesl in 
Lhe mines: 
"It is, of course, true that the leases here under review did not convey 
title to the unextracted ore deposits, ... ; but it is equally true that such 
leases, conferring upon the lessee the exclusive possession of the deposits 
and the valuable right of removing and reducing the ore to ownership, 
created a very real and substantial interest therein .... And there can be 
110 doubt that such an interest is property." Lynch v. A/worth-Stephens Co., 
21i7 U. s. :164, '.1(i!). 
W2(i CFR § I.GI 1-1 (b). 
" 
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tinguishes a mere "economic advantage" 11 from a depletable 
"economic interest," and argues that two cases-Parsons v. 
Srnith, 359 U.S. 215, and Paragon jewel Coal Co. v. Cornmis-
sioner, 380 U. S. 624-in which the Court concluded that 
mining contractors had only an "economic advantage" 
rather than an "economic interest" in coal deposits-support 
the conclusion that these lessees also had a mere "economic 
advantage." Second, the Government argues as a matter of 
"practical economics" that the right to terminate gives the 
lessor the only significant economic interest in the coal. 
Neither submission is persuasive. 
The Parsons opinion covered two consolidated cases with 
similar facts. In each the owner of coal bearing land en-
tered. into a contract with the taxpayer providing that the · 
taxpayer would strip mine the coal and deliver it to the 
owner for a fixed price per ton. Neither of the contracts 
purported to give the mining contractor any interest in the 
coal, either before or after it was mined, or any right to sell it 
to third parties. See 359 U.S., at 216-219. The contracts 
were terminable on short notice and terminability was one of 
the seven factors the court listed to support its conclusion 
that the independent contractors did not have an economic 
· interest in the coal.'" It is perfectly clear, however, that the 
" The regulation provides an example of such an "economic 
advantage": 
"[A]n agreement between the owner of an economic interest and an-
other entitling the latter to purchase or process the product upon produc-
tion or entitling the latter to compensation for extraction or cutting does 
not convey a depletable economic interest." Id. 
" The coun listed the seven factors in this paragraph: 
"To recapitulate, the asserted fiction is opposed to the facts (1) that peti-
tioners' investments were in their equipment, all of which was movable-
not in the coal in place; (2) that their investments in equipment were re-
coverable through depreciation-not depletion; (3) that the contracLi were 
r0111/1ll'lf'ly /aminable without cause on short notice; (4) that the landowners did 
not agree to surrender and did not actually surrender to petitioners any 
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Court would have reached the same conclusion if that factor 
had not been present. 
The facts in the Paragon jewel case were much like those in 
Parsons, except that the mining contractors dealt with lessees 
instead of the owners of the underground coal. As in Par-
sons, the contractors agreed to mine the coal at their own ex-
pense and deliver it to Paragon's tipple at a fixed fee per ' 
ton.'" The contractors had no control over the coal after 
delivery to Paragon, had no responsibility for its sale or in 
fixing its price, and did not even know the price at which 
Paragon sold the coal. 380 U.S., at 628. The Court stated 
that the Commissioner took the position that: 
"[O]nly a taxpayer with a legally enforceable right to 
share in the value of a mineral deposit has a depletable 
capital interest in the coal in place; (5) that the coal at all times, even after 
it was mined, belonged entirely to the landowners, and that petitioners 
could not sell or keep any of it but were required to deliver all that they 
mined to the landowners; (6) that petitioners were not to have any part of 
the proceeds of the sale of the coal, but, on the contrary, they were to be 
paid a fixed sum for each ton mined and delivered, which was, as stated i1,1 
Huss, agreed to be in 'full compensation for the full performance of aH 
work and for the furnishing of all [labor] and equipment required for the 
work'; and (7) that petitioners, thus, agreed to look only to the landowners 
[or all sums to become due them under their contracts. The agreement 
of the landowners to pay a fixed sum per ton for mining and delivering 
the coal 'was a personal covenant and did not purport to grant [petition-
ers] an interest in the [coal in place].' Helvering v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 
370, 372. Surely these facts show that petitioners did not actually make 
any capital investment in, or acquire any economic interest in, the coal in 
place, and that they may not fictionally be regarded as having done so." 
395 U.S., at 225 (Emphasis added). 
''' Although this fee ".aried depending on the general trends of the mar-
ket price and labor costs, the Court noted that such changes "were always 
prospective, the contractors being notified several days in advance of any 
change so that they always knew the amount they would get for the min~ 
ing of the coal upon delivery." 380 U.S., at 628. 
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capital or economic interest in that deposit and the con-
tract miners in this case had no such interest in the 
unmined coal." Id., at 627. 
The Court agreed that the miners did not have an economic 
interest in the coal: 
"Here, Paragon was bound to pay the posted fee re-
gardless of the condition of the market at the time of the 
particular delivery and thus the contract miners did not 
look to the sale of the coal for a return of their invest-
ment, but looked solely to Paragon to abide by its cov-
enant." Id., at 635. 
Thus in Paragon Jewel Coal Co., as in Parsons, the termin-
ability of the agreements was not the dispositive factor,"" and 
neither case answers the narrow question before us in this 
case.2' 
The contrast between the interest of the contractors in 
Parsons and Paragon and the lessees in these cases is stark. 
Whereas those contractors never acquired any legal interest 
in the coal, the lessees in these cases had a legal interest in 
the mineral both before and after it was mined, and were 
'" With respect to the terminability issue, although no specific right to 
terminate was mentioned in the agreement, the Paragon Jewel Court con-
cluded that because the contractors had apparently been able to terminate 
at will, such a power should also be imputed to Paragon. The Court indi-
cated, however, that even if the agreements were not terminable at will, 
the "right to mine to exhaustion, without more, does not constitute an eco-
nomic interest under Parsons." id., at 634. 
"Another distinguishing feature of Paragon jewel is that that case really 
presented an issue respecting which taxpayer-the contract miner or the 
lessee-should receive the depletion allowance. See 380 U. S., at 626, 
630; id., at 639-649 (Goldberg,]., dissenting). The fact that the existence 
of a right to terminate is relevant in what is esentially a dispute between 
the parties to the contract surely does not support the conclusion that such 
an unexercised right has any bearing on the question whether any tax-
payer may claim percentage depletion. 
; 
,. 
9$15151, 25-MAR-81 DRB, 3/25 revise wmk 
12 
79- 1515- 0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. SWANK 
free to sell the coal at whatever price the market could bear. 
Indeed, the Government does not contend that, absent the 
termination clauses, the lessees would not have had an eco-
nomic interest in the coal. In contrast, it seems clear that 
the contract miners' interest in the Parsons and Paragon cases 
would have been insufficient even if their agreements had 
been for a fixed term. 
The Government, however, does argue that the lessors' 
right to terminate the leases alone made the taxpayers' inter-
est so tenuous as to defeat a claim to the percentage deple-
tion deduction."" According to the Government, as a matter 
of "practical economics" an increase in the price of the min-
erals will "assuredly" lead to an exercise of the lessor's right 
to terminate; accordingly, the only significant economic in-
terest is controlled by the lessor. We find this theoretical ar-
gument unpersuasive for at least three reasons. 
First, the royalty rate is a relatively small element of the 
mine operator's total cost."' Therefore, even if the price of 
coal increases, the lessor cannot be certain that he will be 
able to negotiate a more favorable lease with another lessee. 
""Although he has a potential right to benefit from a rise in the mar-
ket, that right is illusory for practical economics will compel the lessor to 
terminate the lease and conclude a more favorable arrangement if market 
conditions so dictate ." Brief for Petitioner 19. 
"As we have pointed out (supra , p. 19), if the market price of the miner-
als rises above the lessor's royalty, the lessor will assuredly exercise his 
right to terminate the lease on short notice and will either enter into a 
more profitable lease or extract the mineral himself and sell it. In these 
circumstances, the lease provision permiuing termination on short notice 
gives the lessor the unilateral right to assume complete and unfettered do-
minion over the mineral deposit, viz., an economic interest in the minerals 
in place. The unexercised termination clause therefore has profound 
economic significance, rather than , as the decision below erroneously con-
cluded (Pet. App: 5a) , "mere existence." Id., at 21 - 22 (footnotes 
omitted) . 
" ln Swank , for example, th_e royalty payment was 25¢ per ton, while 
the price of coal apparently approached $20.00 per ton. Seen. 8, supra. 
; ,. . 
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Moreover, the quantity of coal extracted by the operator 
each year may be as important in providing royalties for the 
lessor as the rate per ton. Purely as a theoretical matter, it 
therefore is by no means certain that an increase in the price 
of coal will induce a lessor to terminate a satisfactory busi-
ness relationship. · Indeed, the only evidence in the 
record-the history of three different operations that were 
uninterrupted for many years-tends to belie the Govern-
ment's entire argument!' 
Second, from the standpoint of the' taxpayer who did in 
fact conduct a prolonged and continuous operation, it would 
seem rather unfair to deny him a tax benefit that is available 
to his competitors simply because he accepted a business 
risk-the risk of termination-that his competitors were able 
to avoid when they negotiated their mining leases. It is un-
likely that Congress intended to limit the availability of the 
percentage depletion deduction to the mining operations 
with the greatest bargaining power. 
Third, and most important, the Government has not sug-
gested any rational basis for linking the right to a depletion 
deduction to the period of time that the taxpayer operates a 
mine. If the authorization of a special tax benefit for min-
ing a seam of coal to exhaustion is sound policy, that policy 
would seem equally sound whether the entire operation is 
" The Court of Claims opinion also recognized the weakness of this ar-
gument. The court stated that counsel for one of the taxpayers at oral 
argument had noted that the lessors had not terminated even though the 
value of coal had increased markedly. The taxpayer argued that lessors 
would be reluctant to terminate because "the costs of continuing with an 
existing mine are usually so great, comparatively, that it is difficult for a 
lessor to obtain new lessees at terms more favorable to the lessors than the 
existing leases." 602 F. 2d, at 351, n. 9. The court did not accept these 
representations as evidence but indicated that "the record contains noth-
ing Lo contradict this explanation for what seems to be the fact that leases 
of this type have not been regularly cancelled by lessors in recent years." 
Ibid. 
·. 
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conducted by one taxpayer over a prolonged period or by a 
series of taxpayers operating for successive shorter periods. 
The Government has suggested no reason why the efficient 
removal of a great quantity of coal in less than 30 days 
should have different tax consequences than the slower re-
moval of the same quantity over a prolonged period!" 
The Court of Claims correctly concluded that the mere 
existence of the lessors' unexercised right to terminate these 
leases did not destroy the taxpayers' economic interest in the 
leased mineral deposits. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
,·,As we have indicated, the depletion deduction is geared to the deple-
1ion of the mineral in place, and not to the taxpayer's capital investment. 
Therefore, we can perceive no reason to impose duration requirements 
on the availability of the deduction for taxpayers who admittedly other-
wise have an "economic interest" in the coal, are dependent on the market 
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